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ABSTRACT

As a result of the disability rights movement's fight for the
development of community-based services, the percentage of people with
intellectual and developmental disabilities (JIDD) and mental illness living
in institutions has significantly decreased over the last few decades.
However, in part because of government failure to invest properly in
community-based services required for a successful transition from
institutions, individuals with disabilities are now dramatically
overrepresented in jails and prisons. The Americans with Disabilities
Act's (ADA) "integration mandate"-a principle strengthened by the
Supreme Court's 1999 Olmstead v. L.C. decision, entitling individuals
with disabilities to receive services in the most integrated setting
appropriate to their needs-may provide one avenue to disrupt the schoolto-prison pipeline and overrepresentation of people with JDD and mental
illness in prisons and jails. In this Article, we explore how the federal
government and private parties have used-and are beginning to use in
new ways-the integration mandate to advocate for the rights of
individuals with disabilities to receive the supports they need to thrive in
the community and avoid unnecessary entanglement with the criminal
justice system.
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INTRODUCTION

Until the early 1970s, the tragic reality for many with intellectual and
developmental disabilities (I/DD) and mental illness1 in this country was
one of segregation and exclusion in locked institutions, based on the
premise that there was no place for such individuals in the community at
large. As a result of the disability rights movement's fight for people with
disabilities to be freed from large, state-run institutions and receive
community-based services instead, the percentage of those with IJDD and
mental illness living in institutions has significantly decreased over the last
few decades.2 Since the late 1960s, and for a variety of reasons, states have
closed and downsized numerous institutions, with the number of
Americans confined in mental hospitals reduced from approximately
560,000 in 1955 to 35,000 as of 2016. 3 The number of institutionalized
people with I/DD has also seen a dramatic decrease from 195,000 in 1967
to 21,000 in 2015.' People with disabilities themselves, disability rights
I. In this Article, we use the terms "people with mental illness," "people with psychiatric
disabilities," or "people with mental health needs" to describe those people who have been diagnosed
with psychiatric conditions such as schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and major depression, among
others.
2.
See, e.g., ROBERT BERNSTEIN ET AL., DIVERSION, NOT DISCRIMINATION: How
IMPLEMENTING THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT CAN HELP REDUCE THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE

WITH MENTAL ILLNESS IN JAILS 5 (2017);

ANDREW J. IMPARATO & MARGARET A. NYGREN,

COMMUNITY LIvING AND PARTICIPATION FOR PEOPLE WITH INTELLECTUAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL
DISABILITIES: WHAT THE RESEARCH TELLS US 2-3 (2015); REBECCA VALLAS, DISABLED BEHIND
BARS: THE MASS INCARCERATION OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES IN AMERICA'S JAILS AND PRISONS

1 (2016); Samuel R. Bagenstos, The PastandFutureof DeinstitutionalizationLitigation,34 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1,4-5 (2012).
3.

See GERALD N. GROB, THE MAD AMONG US: A HISTORY OF THE CARE OF AMERICA'S

MENTALLY ILL 291 (1994) (559,000 confined in state psychiatric hospitals as of 1955, the highpoint
of such confinement); E. Fuller Torrey, A Dearth of PsychiatricBeds, PSYCHIATRIC TIMES (Feb. 25,
2016),
https://www.psychiatrictimes.com/psychiatric-emergencies/dearth-psychiatric-beds
("Currently [as of Feb. 20161, there are about 35,000 state psychiatric beds available, or about 11 beds
per 100,000 population."). The reasons for this reduction are complex and beyond the scope of this
Article, but include the introduction of psychotropic medications, the growth of community-based
mental health care, the enactment of Medicaid, and the tightening of civil commitment standards to
require dangerousness in addition to mental illness. See generallyGROB, supra; ALISA ROTH, INSANE:
AMERICA'S CRIMINAL TREATMENT OF MENTAL ILLNESS 74-76 (2018).
4.
AMIE LULINSKI & EMILY SHEA TANIS, USE OF STATE INSTITUTIONS FOR PEOPLE WITH
INTELLECTUAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES IN THE UNITED STATES (2018). The Medicaid
Home and Community Based Services (HCBS) Waiver, enacted in 1983, has played a major part in
redirecting Medicaid funding from congregate institutions to community-based services. See generally
Home
&
Community
Based
Services,
MEDICAID.GOV,
https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/hcbs/index.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2019) (discussing how the
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advocates and allies, and experts in the I/DD and mental health fields
and services in place of
commend this shift to community-based supports
5
segregated and isolated institutional settings.
However, just as the deinstitutionalization movement took hold, the
era of mass incarceration began. According to recent statistics, seven
people were incarcerated for every one thousand in the general
population-a rate four times as high as the level of incarceration in 1970,
when these rates began to rise. 6 Among other factors, the transition of
people with IIDD and mental illness out of state-run institutions, coupled
with states' failure to provide sufficient community-based supports and
services to ensure their success in the community, led to the incarceration
of those with I/DD and mental illness at alarming rates.7 Indeed, people
program allows beneficiaries to receive services in their own communities rather than in institutions);
Home

&

Community

Based

Services

Authorities,

MEDICAtD.GOV,

(last visited Apr. 18, 2019)
https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/hcbs/authorities/index.html
(discussing the formation of HCBS in the 1980s).
5. BERNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2; IMPARATO & NYGREN, supra note 2, at 1-3.
6. Margo Schlanger, Anti-IncarcerativeRemedies for Illegal Conditions of Confinement, 6 U.
MIAMI RACE & SOC. JUST. L. REv. 1, 1 (2016) (citing various reports from the U.S. Department of
Justice and the U.S. Census Bureau); see also ROTH, supra note 3, at 74 ("Between 1971 and 2004,
the prison population in the United States went from about 200,000 to 1.4 million, a 600 percent
increase. Over the same period, jail populations went from about 130,000 to more than 700,000."
(citing MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE 19-20 (2006))).

7. While some have used these numbers to make the case for the failure of community-based
supports and services and re-institutionalization, the evidence tells a different story. Rather, people
with disabilities must have access to comprehensive and high-quality services in the community to
avoid these outcomes. For a more thorough discussion of this topic, see, e.g., BERNSTEIN ET AL., supra
note 2, at 6 ("Deinstitutionalization is often identified as the reason there are so many people with
mental illness in America'sjails and prisons ....But, for a number of reasons, that is not a complete
or accurate story. First, deinstitutionalization, as a policy or program, was supposed to be linked to
and coordinated with the development of a comprehensive network of community mental health
programs that were intended to replace hospital care and allow people with mental illness to live
successfully in their communities. America failed to deliver on that promise-not because it lacked
the ability to do so, but rather because lawmakers lacked the political will to fund and ensure the
availability of much-needed services in localities nationwide, including outpatient treatment,
residential and crisis services, and case management that coordinated between the mental health
system and law enforcement and courts. At its core, the disproportionate involvement of people with
mental illness in the criminal justice system (from police contact through incarceration) reflects the
broken promise that community services would replace hospitalization. Deinstitutionalization was
never meant to abandon people with mental illness or require them and their families to rely on their
own devices for treatment and housing.... State spending on mental health services actually declined
in the era of deinstitutionalization .... [O]nly fragments of what was intended to be a comprehensive
system of community mental health services materialized."); IMPARATO & NYGREN, supra note 2, at
I ("Recent authors... have called for the increased availability of segregated residences, citing such
concerns as long waiting lists for services, significant stress on family caregivers, high rates of staff
turnover in community settings, and the lack of specialized caregiver training that results in supports
and services that are unstable and sometimes unreliable. The calls have been to create larger, more
segregated facilities that ean provide more targeted support. These concerns are both real and
significant. However, the solution is not to return to the building of large, segregated, isolated
institutions ....Solutions should come from the experience of people with intellectual and
developmental disabilities (IDD) and from five decades of research, practices and policies."); SARAH
LIEBOWITZ ET AL., A WAY FORWARD: DIVERTING PEOPLE WITH MENTAL ILLNESS FROM INHUMANE
AND EXPENSIVE JAILS INTO COMMUNITY-BASED TREATMENT THAT WORKS 6 (2014) ("Inhumane,

ineffective, and expensive mental institutions throughout the nation began shuttering in the 1950s, in
a process called deinstitutionalization. ...But governments did not simultaneously take steps to
ensure the availability of, and funding for, the community-based alternatives that experts have been
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with disabilities are dramatically overrepresented in prisons and jails.
Research shows that about 32% of prisoners and 40% ofjail inmates 8 have
at least one disability in contrast to 11% of the general population. 9 About
20% of prisoners and 31% of jail inmates report having a cognitive
disability-such as Down syndrome, autism, intellectual disability, or
dementia, among others-in contrast to a less than 5% prevalence rate in
the general population. " As many as 10% of individuals in jails have an
intellectual and/or developmental disability in contrast to 1.5% in the
general population, 1 while one in five prison inmates have serious mental
illness in contrast to around 4% of the general population. 12The Judge
David L. Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law (the Bazelon Center), in
a report with the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Southern
California, noted that "[j]ails have become warehouses for people with
mental illness"' 3 and emphasized that the "lack of community mental
health services, coupled with mass incarceration of non-violent offenders,
has resulted in three jails-the Los Angeles County Jails, Rikers Island
Correctional Facility in New York City, and Cook County Jail in
Chicago--having the distinction of being the nation's largest psychiatric
institutions."14 Of those with disabilities who are incarcerated, some have
not even been convicted of a crime in cases where they have been found
incompetent to stand trial or where their competency determination is in
process.'" As Michael Perlin has noted: "[T]he vast majority of
incompetency evaluations are held in maximum security facilities without
regard to the severity of the crime or the dangerousness of the defendant"

recommending for decades."); ROTH, supra note 3, at 74 (characterizing the view that closure of
mental hospitals has led directly to increase ofpeople with mental illness in the criminaljustice system,
by noting, "The trouble is, much of the story is wrong"); VALLAS, supra note 2 ("While widely
regarded as a positive development, deinstitutionalization was not accompanied by the public

investment necessary to ensure that community-based alternatives were made available."); Bagenstos,
supra note 2, at 11 12 ("The indictment ofdeinstitutionalization, as opposed to the failure to invest in

community-based services and supports, does not rest on an empirical determination of what happened
in the world so much as on a normative premise that institutionalization is preferable to communitybased housing and supports.").
8.
Jails are locally operated facilities that hold individuals awaiting trial or sentencing as well

as those generally serving sentences of one year or less. Prisons are state or federally run facilities for
individuals with felony convictions or those serving sentences of more than one year. FAQ Detail,
BUREAU JUST. STAT., https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfi-?ty=qa&iid=322 (last visited Apr. 18, 2019).
9.
JENNIFER BRONSON ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DISABILITIES AMONG PRISON
AND JAIL INMATES, 2011-2012, at 3 (2015).
10.
Id.
1I. Anna Scheyett et al., Are We There Yet? Screening Processes for Intellectual and
Developmental Disabilities in Jail Settings, 47 INTELL. & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 13, 14
(2009).
12.
See, e.g., BERNSTEIN ETAL., supra note 2, at 19;VALLAS, supra note 2, at 1-2.
13.
LtEBOWITZ ET AL., supra note 7, at 1.

No

14.

Id. at6.

15.

See, e.g., Julianne Hill, PrisonsAre Housing Mental Health Patients Who 've Committed
Crimes,
A.B.A.
J.,
Jan.-Feb.
2019,

http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/breakdown

prisons-mental-health-patients.
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and "[t]he length of time for such evaluations
often extends far beyond the
16
possible maximum potential sentence."
These statistics are disturbing in their own right, but an explanation
of the heightened challenges and harms that people with disabilities
experience while incarcerated is also essential to understanding the
severity of this problem. As Margo Schlanger describes:
Prisoners with mental disabilities face grave difficulties in prison and
jail; they can have trouble adapting to new requirements and
understanding what is expected of them, getting along with others, and
following institutional rules. In the absence of treatment and
to be victimized and to commit
habilitation, they are more likely both
17
both minor and major misconduct.
Individuals may also acquire additional disabilities during their
incarceration. As Rebecca Vallas notes in a recent report from the Center
for American Progress, "Poor conditions in jails and prisons and
inadequate access to health care and mental health treatment can not only
exacerbate existing conditions, but also lead to further psychical and
mental health problems that individuals did not have prior to
incarceration." 18 It does not have to be this way.
A brief overview of relevant federal disability rights laws is
instructive here. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
(Section 504) requires that "[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a
disability in the United States ... shall, solely by reason of her or his

disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination."' 9 In 1976, President Gerald R. Ford
issued an executive order instructing the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare (HEW) to issue regulations implementing Section 504 to
include "establish[ing] standards for determining who are handicapped
individuals and guidelines for determining what are discriminatory
16.
Michael L. Perlin, "For the Misdemeanor Outlaw": The Impact of the ADA on the
Institutionalizationof CriminalDefendants with Mental Disabilities, 52 ALA. L. REV. 193, 202, 204,
207 (2000) (further noting that "[t]he Supreme Court's decision in Jackson v. Indiana, banning
indeterminate commitments in incompetency evaluation cases if there is no reasonable probability that
the defendant will regain his competence within the 'foreseeable future,' has had surprisingly ... little
impact on these practices. Astonishingly, more than half the states allow for the indefinite commitment
of incompetent-to-stand-trial defendants, in spite of Jackson's specific language outlawing this
practice."); see also DISABILITY RIGHTS WASH., LOST AND FORGOTTEN: CONDITIONS OF
CONFINEMENT WHILE WAITING FOR COMPETENCY EVALUATION AND RESTORATION 4-5 (2013).
Schlanger, supra note 6, at 2-3 (citing JOAN PETERSILIA ET AL., DOING JUSTICE? THE
17.
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND OFFENDERS WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 10-11 (2000);
MORRIS L. THIGPEN ET AL., EFFECTIVE PRISON MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES: GUIDELINES TO EXPAND
AND IMPROVE TREATMENT 6-7 (2004)).
18.
VALLAS, supra note 2, at 3 (citing INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES,
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR RESEARCH INVOLVING PRISONERS 44-47 (Lawrence 0. Gostin et al.

eds., 2006)); see also Michelle Andrews, Even in Prison, Health Care Often Comes with a Copay,
http://www.npr.org/sections/health11:08
AM),
(Sept.
30,
2015,
NPR
shots/2015/09/30/444451967/even-in-prisonhealth-care-often-comes-with-a-copay.
19.
29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2018).

922
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practices, within the meaning of section 504.,,2o The President also
instructed every federal agency that distributes federal funds to "issue
rules, regulations, and directives, consistent with the standards and
procedures established by" HEW.2' In 1981, Executive Order 12250
transferred
the
coordination
responsibility
for
Section 504's
implementation and enforcement among federal agencies to the
Department of Justice (DOJ).22
Section 504's mandate applies to "any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by
any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service."23 The law
requires agencies to conduct their programs and activities in the most
integrated setting appropriate for the individual defendant with a
disability. In 1978, HEW issued Section 504 regulations requiring
recipients of federal funds to "administer programs and activities in the
most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified handicapped
persons."' 24 The preamble to these regulations noted that "separate"
treatment of individuals with disabilities "can be permitted only where
necessary to ensure equal opportunity and truly effective benefits and
services. 25 Later, other agencies, including the DOJ, promulgated
Section 504 regulations governing recipients of federal funding that
included the same integration requirement. 26 Thus, it is well-established
that to comply with the Section 504's integration mandate, federal
agencies must make reasonable modifications of their policies,
procedures, or practices when necessary to avoid discrimination. 27 The
federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) is a program of DOJ and, therefore, must
comply with Section 504.
In 1990, Congress enacted the landmark Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA) "to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for
the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities. ' 28
In passing this groundbreaking law, Congress recognized that
"historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with
disabilities, and, despite some improvements, such forms of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities continue to be a serious
and pervasive social problem., 29 Significantly, Congress found that
20.
Exec. Order No. 11,914, 41 Fed. Reg. 17,871 (Apr. 29, 1976).
21.
Id.
22.
Exec. Order No. 12,250, 45 Fed. Reg. 72,995 (Nov. 2, 1980).
23.
29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
24.
Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap in Federally Assisted Programs, 43 Fed. Reg.
2138 (Jan. 13, 1978).

25.

Id. at 2134.

26.

See, e.g.,
28 C.F.R. § 39.130(d) (2019).

27. See, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 301 (1985) (recognizing that "to assure
meaningful access [under Section 504], reasonable accommodations in the grantee's program or
benefit may have to be made").
28.

42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1).

29.

Id. § 12101(a)(2).

2019]
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"discrimination against individuals with disabilities persists in such
critical

areas

as ... institutionalization."30

Congress

prohibited

discrimination against individuals with disabilities by public entities, such
as state and local governments: "[N]o qualified individual with a disability
shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be
denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public
entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." 3' As public
entities, law enforcement, corrections, and justice system entities are
prohibited by the ADA from discriminating against people with
disabilities.32 This inclusion means that state and locally operated prisons
and jails 33 must modify their policies, practices, and procedures to avoid
discrimination and ensure equal access for individuals with disabilities
while they are incarcerated.34 The text of the ADA notes that it is based on

30.
Id. § 12101(a)(3) (emphasis added).
31.
Id. § 12132.
32.
Id.; see also 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (2019) ("Public entity means... Any department, agency,
special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government .... "); U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMMONLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
AND LAW ENFORCEMENT (2006), https://www.ada.gov/q&a-law.htm [hereinafter U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, COMMONLY ASKED QUESTIONS] ("Title 11 of the ADA prohibits discrimination against

people with disabilities in State and local governments services, programs, and employment. Law
enforcement agencies are covered because they are programs of State or local governments, regardless
of whether they receive Federal grants or other Federal funds."); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, EXAMPLES
AND RESOURCES TO SUPPORT CRIMINAL JUSTICE ENTITLES IN COMPLIANCE WITH TITLE II OF THE

AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (2017), https://www.ada.gov/cjta.html [hereinafter U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, EXAMPLES AND RESOURCES] ("Pursuant to the ADA, state and local government criminal

justice entities-including police, courts, prosecutors, public defense attorneys, jails, juvenile justice,
and corrections agencies-must ensure that people with mental health disabilities or I/DD are treated
equally in the criminal justice system and afford them equal opportunity to benefit from safe, inclusive
communities.").
33.
Federal prisons are governed by Section 504. State-run prisons are subject to Title II of the
ADA (and Section 504 when federal funds are involved), as are, by extension, locally run jails and
correctional facilities, given that Title I1applies to public entities, defined to include state and local
governments and their departments and instrumentalities. 42 U.S.C. § 1213 1(1); Pa. Dep't of Corr. v.
Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210 (1998). Where federal, state, and local governments choose to operate their
correctional facilities through contracts with private companies, the federal, state, and local
government entities are not thereby exempt from Section 504 or the ADA. See, e.g., 28
C.F.R. § 35.152(a) ("This section applies to public entities that are responsible for the operation or
management of adult and juvenile justice jails, detention and correctional facilities, and community
correctional facilities, either directly or through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements with
public or private entities, in whole or in part, including private correctional facilities."). Section 504
plainly governs "any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program
or activity conducted by any Executive agency." 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2018). Most cases have held that
private correctional facilities are not themselves public entities governed by the ADA or Section 504.
See, e.g., Phillips v. Tiona, 508 F. App'x 737, 748-54 (10th Cir. 2013) (surveying current case law on
the issue and holding that the Corrections Corporation of America, a private, for-profit corporation,
was not subject to Title I1 of the ADA); Edison v. Douberly, 604 F.3d 1307, 1310 (11 th Cir. 2010)
(finding that defendant employees of a private prison management corporation operating prisons in
Florida were not subject to Title II). However, inmates in private prisons could still file Section 504
or ADA claims against the relevant public entity responsible for overseeing the private facilities. See,
e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b); Armstrong v. Schwarzenegger, 622 F.3d 1058, 1069 (9th Cir. 2010).
34.
See, e.g., Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 219 (finding that the ADA "unmistakably includes State
prisons and prisoners within its coverage"); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, EXAMPLES AND RESOURCES,
supra note 32.
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the "remedies, procedures and rights" of Section 504, 3 and courts have
36
interpreted the statutes consistently.
Private plaintiffs and the DOJ both have pursued litigation to advance
the rights of incarcerated individuals with disabilities to receive reasonable
modifications while incarcerated. Some examples of the sort of
modifications that prisons and jails may be required to provide to
incarcerated individuals with disabilities, under the ADA and its
guaranteeing
effective
corresponding
regulations,
include:
communication to individuals who are deaf or blind, such as through video
relay phones or Braille materials; ensuring access to medications,
prosthetic limbs, and hearings aids; providing accessible facilities; and
avoiding the use of solitary confinement and segregation for individuals
with mental illness or I/DD. 3 7
However, the ADA may, at times, require not just modifications to
policies and practices in the correctional setting but also alternatives to
incarceration itself when appropriate. The Title II regulations require
public entities to "administer services, programs, and activities in the most
integratedsetting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with
disabilities."38 What has become known as the ADA's "integration
mandate"--a principle strengthened by the Supreme Court's 1999
Olmstead v. L. C.3 9 decision, finding that "unjustified institutional isolation

35.
42 U.S.C. § 12133 ("The remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in section 794a of Title
29 shall be the remedies, procedures, and rights this subchapter provides to any person alleging
discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of section12132 of this title.").
36.
See, e.g., Cohon ex rel. Bass v. N.M Dep't of Health, 646 F.3d 717, 725-26 (10th Cir.
2011); Bircoll v. Miami-Dade Cty., 480 F.3d 1072, 1088 n.21 (1 th Cir. 2007); Henrietta D. v.
Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 272 (2d Cir. 2003); Delano-Pyle v. Victoria Cty., 302 F.3d 567, 574 (5th
Cir. 2002); Baird ex rel. Baird v. Rose, 192 F.3d 462, 468 (4th Cir. 1999); Zukle v. Regents of Univ.
of Cal., 166 F.3d 1041, 1045 n.1 1 (9th Cir. 1999); Theriault v. Flynn, 162 F.3d 46, 48 n.3 (1st Cir.
1998); Gorman v. Bartch, 152 F.3d 907, 912 (8th Cir. 1998); McPherson v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic
Ass'n, 119 F.3d 453,459-60 (6th Cir. 1997); Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 330 n.7 (3d Cir. 1995).
37.
For surveys of ADA accommodations cases within prisons, see, e.g., EQUIP FOR EQUAL.,
THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT IN JAIL & PRISON 3 (2016); ANNA GUY, AMPLIFYING
VOICES OF INMATES WITH DISABILITIES PRISON PROJECT, LOCKED UP AND LOCKED DOWN:
SEGREGATION OF INMATES WITH MENTAL ILLNESS 5, 35 (2016); MARGO SCHLANGER, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION SOCIETY, HOW THE ADA REGULATES AND RESTRICTS SOLITARY CONFINEMENT FOR
PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES 2-7 (2016); RACHEL SEEVERS, AMPLIFYING VOICES OF INMATES
WITH DISABILITIES PRISON PROJECT, MAKING HARD TIME HARDER: PROGRAMMATIC
ACCOMMODATIONS FOR INMATES WITH DISABILITIES UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES
ACT 16-35 (2016); Jamelia N. Morgan, Caged in: The Devastating Harms of Solitary Confinement
on Prisoners with Physical Disabilities, 24 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 81, 82, 85 (2018); ADA
in
Criminal
Justice
Settings,
ADA.GOV,
Enforcement
https://www.ada.gov/criminaljustice/cj-enforcement.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2019). DOJ's most
recent initiative in this area is its issuance of a Notice Regarding Investigation of the Hampton Roads
Regional Jail, dated December 19, 2018. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NOTICE REGARDING INVESTIGATION
OF THE HAMPTON ROADS REGIONAL JAIL 1 (2018). DOJ alleges that the jail fails to provide prisoners
with mental health disabilities adequate mental health care and access to programs, as well as
subjecting them to prolonged confinement in restrictive housing conditions. Id.
38.
28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (emphasis added).
39.
527 U.S. 581 (1999).

ADA 'S "INTEGRATION MANDATE"

2019]

of persons with disabilities is a form of discrimination" 40-may provide
an avenue to disrupt the mass incarceration of people with disabilities.
Specifically, advocates are currently using the integration mandate in
actions challenging the segregated and inferior conditions that often
engender the school-to-prison pipeline for students with disabilities and
ensuring that people with disabilities can gain access to community-based
alternatives to incarceration when charged with crimes. 4 '
In different contexts, scholars have urged litigators to use the
requirements of the ADA and the principles articulated by the Court in
Olmstead to challenge unjust incarceration and conditions of confinement
of individuals with mental disabilities.4" This Article adds to such
commentaries by exploring how lawyers are using the Olmsteadprecedent
in current litigation to ensure that individuals with disabilities receive the
support they need to thrive in the community and, thus, avoid becoming
entangled with the justice system in the first place. This Article further
discusses how, for those already incarcerated, there are specific instances
in which the ADA's integration mandate may be useful in arguing for a
less restrictive placement when appropriate.
Much of the litigation discussed in this Article is in its early stages,
and judicial acceptance of this application of Olmstead is nascent at best.
Although extension of the Olmstead imperative to the criminal justice
system may seem inconsistent with the treatment and services orientation
of the case, this Article argues that there is nothing in the ADA, the
Olmstead decision, or its underlying rationale that preclude its application
to the criminal justice context.

40.

Id. at 600; see also U.S.

ON ENFORCEMENT

DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATEMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
OF THE INTEGRATION MANDATE OF TITLE II OF THE AMERICANS WITH

DISABILITIES ACT AND OLMSTEAD V. L.C. 1-2(2011).

41.
See infra Part 1I.
See, e.g., Perlin, supra note 16, at 232-33 ("Under Olmstead, policies that require the
42.
automatic (or de jure) commitment of all incompetency and insanity pleaders to maximum security
facilities-notwithstanding the nature of the charge or the individual dangerousness of the
defendant-potentially violate the ADA, in part, at least, because of their explicit and implicit lack of
individualization. After Olmstead, individualized determinations must be made in each case as to

whether or not such maximum security institutionalization is necessary ....Certainly, a significant
number of individuals in each of these categories could be treated in settings less restrictive than the

")(emphasis added); Schlanger, supra note 6, at 3-5
state's maximum security forensic facility ....
(arguing that where certain conditions of confinement create environments that are particularly
harmful to individuals with mental disabilities and are illegal under the Eighth Amendment, ADA, or
other source of law, "plaintiffs should seek, and courts should grant, court-enforceable remedies

diverting prisoners away from incarceration, in order to keep vulnerable populations out of jail and
prison" and urging "a new generation of anti-incarcerative remedies in conditions lawsuits,
unconnected to a population order, whose purpose is to keep vulnerable would-be prisoners out of
harm's way by promoting workable alternatives to incarceration").

DENVER LAWREVIEW
I.

OVERVIEW OF OLMSTEAD V.

[Vol. 96:4
L. C.

A. Case Background
For people with l/DD and mental illness, Olmstead is the most
significant ADA case the U.S Supreme Court has decided since the law
was passed in 1990. 4 1 Olmstead is noteworthy for its broad recognition of
the rights of people institutionalized in congregate facilities to live and
receive needed services and supports in the community. Critically,
Olmstead endorsed the congressional finding in the ADA that
institutionalization constituted discrimination.44 The case concerned two
individuals with intellectual and psychiatric disabilities, L.C. and E.W.45
Both women were in and out of institutional settings in Georgia and filed
suit claiming that their confinement in a segregated environment violated
their constitutional rights to due process and their statutory rights to
nondiscrimination under Title II of the ADA.46
The plaintiffs in Olmstead were not the first to argue that individuals
with I/DD and mental illness had a right to receive services in communitybased settings. The case built on landmark right to treatment and right to
habilitation cases in the late 1970s and early 1980s that recognized the
viability and necessity of community-based care for people with
disabilities.4 7 The constitutional effect of these cases, however, had stalled
after the Supreme Court's 1982 decision in Youngberg v. Romeo. 48 In
Youngberg, the Court held that institutionalized persons have a liberty
interest in safety and freedom from undue restraint, and that such persons
have a right to "minimally adequate care and treatment" to serve those
liberty interests. 49 However, the Court qualified these statements by
adding that "courts must show deference to the judgment exercised by a
43.
This Section is largely drawn from a prior article by one of the co-authors, Robert D.
Dinerstein, The Olmstead Imperative: The Right to Live in the Community and Beyond, 4 INCLUSION
16, 16-20 (2016); see Bagenstos, supra note 2, at 4-5, 9, 32, for additional discussion of the historical
background and significance of the Olmstead case.
44.
42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3) (2018).
45.
The women were later identified as Lois Curtis and Elaine Wilson. Ms. Wilson is now
deceased. See Derrick Henry, Elaine Wilson Obituary, LEGACY.COM (Dec. 10, 2004),
https://www.legacy.com/obituaries/atanta/obit uary.aspx?n elaine-wilson&pid=2907375;
Sue
Jamieson, Olmstead Champion Meets the President, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (June 22, 2011, 2:06 PM),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/06/22/olmstead-champion-meets-president.
46.
Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 588 (citing Complaint at
87-91).
47.
See, e.g., Evans v. Washington, 459 F. Supp. 483, 484-86 (D.D.C. 1978) (involving Forest
Haven, outside Washington, D.C.); Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295,
1325-28 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (involving Pennhurst, outside Philadelphia); N.Y. Ass'n for Retarded
Children, Inc. v. Carey, 393 F. Supp. 715, 716-19 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (involving Willowbrook in Staten
Island, New York); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (involving Partlow,
Bryce, and Searcy Hospitals in Alabama). The substantial, subsequent history of all of these cases is
omitted.
48.
See, e.g., David Ferleger, The ConstitutionalRight to Community Services, 26 GA. ST. U.
L. REv.763, 778-79 (2010); Michael L. Perlin, "Their Promises of Paradise":Will Olmstead v. L.C.
Resuscitate the Constitutional "Least Restrictive Alternative" Principle in Mental Disability Law?,
37 HOus. L. REV. 999, 1022 (2000).
49.
Id. at 318-20.
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qualified professional," and that decisions by such professionals are
"presumptively valid." 5 Thus, though community-based programs
continued to expand as an alternative to institutions, they did so without
significant judicial imprimatur.
As early as five years following the passage of the ADA in 1990, a
federal appellate court concluded that the ADA required public entities to
administer services to people with disabilities in the most integrated
setting appropriate to their needs.5 Later that year, the initial Olmstead
complaint was filed in federal court.52 In Olmstead, the lower courts did
not address the constitutional question presented, nor did the Supreme
Court.53 Rather, the Court, citing the "integration regulation" issued under
Title II of the ADA, concluded that Title II of the ADA banned
unnecessary institutionalization as a form of discrimination on the basis of
disability."4 Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Court's majority, noted:
Recognition that unjustified institutional isolation of persons with
disabilities is a form of discrimination reflects two evident judgments.
First, institutional placement of persons who can handle and benefit
from community settings perpetuates unwarranted assumptions that
persons so isolated are incapable or unworthy of participating in
community life.... Second, confinement in an institution severely
diminishes the everyday life activities of individuals, including family
relations, social contacts, work options, economic independence,
educational advancement, and cultural enrichment.... Dissimilar
treatment correspondingly exists in this key respect: In order to receive
needed medical services, persons with mental disabilities must,
because of those disabilities, relinquish participation in community life
they could enjoy given reasonable accommodations, while persons
without mental disabilities can receive the medical services they need
55
without similar sacrifice.
The Court qualified its holding by noting that:
States are required to provide community-based treatment for persons
with mental disabilities when the state's treatment professionals
determined that such placement is appropriate, the affected persons do
not oppose such treatment, and the placement can be reasonably

50. Id. at 322-23.
51.
Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 332 (3d Cir. 1995).
52.
Complaint, L.C. v. Olmstead, No. 1:95-cv-01210-MHS (N.D. Ga. May 11, 1995).
53.
Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S 581, 588 (1999) ("This case, as it comes to us, presents no
constitutional question. The complaints filed by plaintiffs-respondents L.C. and E.W. did include such
an issue .... But neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals reached those Fourteenth
Amendment claims.... Instead, the courts below resolved the case solely on statutory grounds. Our
review is similarly confined." (citations omitted)).
54. Id. at 592-97.
55.
Id. at 600-01 (citations omitted).
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accommodated, taking into account the resources available to the state
56
and the needs of others with mental disabilities.
B. The Elements of the Olmstead Decision
It is worth focusing on the three elements of the Olmstead holding,
not only for what the Court wrote but also because further examination of
them lays bare the concerns motivating the Court in its holding. The first
requirement-that a state's professionals determine whether communitybased treatment is appropriate57 -is a tacit reference to the Youngberg
decision described above. In the years leading up to the Youngberg case,
there were differences of opinion among professionals regarding whether
all individuals, including people with severe and profound intellectual
impairments and severe mental illness, could be served in
community-based settings." But between the late 1970s and 1999, when
Olmstead was decided, almost all professional disagreement about the
appropriateness of community-based services for all people with IIDD had
vanished, so that this first element seemed to be stating a truism rather than
marking out controversial territory.5 9 The Court was careful in Olmstead
not to require community placement when professionals deemed it
inappropriate, and it seemed to recognize a continued role for institutions
that many would not support. But as events have played out, the stance of
professionals on community placement has not been an impediment to
community integration. Further, lower courts have interpreted Olmstead
as not limiting plaintiffs to relying on the determinations of the states'
professionals and have permitted plaintiffs to rely on other sources of
evidence-including their own experts-to show that they can be served
60
in community settings.
The second element-that the affected persons not oppose
treatment 6 '-provided a basis for recognizing the value of individual
choice. However, this formulation still left open the unacknowledged
question of what a state must do if an individual under guardianship does

56.

Id. at 607.

57.
Id.
58.
Wyatt v. Ireland, 515 F. Supp. 888, 890 (M.D. Ala. 1981).
59.
In the late 1970s, especially in Wyatt v. Ireland,defendants presented experts who testified
that people who were labeled as having severe or profound intellectual disability needed to be

institutionalized. The Court rejected that position. (One of the Authors of this Article, Robert
Dinerstein, was counsel for "litigating" amicus curiae Department of Justice in the case.) That view
changed over time, as noted in the text. The issue for people with mental illness developed somewhat
differently. After the Supreme Court's decision in O'Connorv. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975),

holding that the state could not confine a nondangerous person with mental illness to an institution if
the person could survive outside of the institution with the help of family and friends, there was
significant momentum to deinstitutionalize chronic mental health patients from institutions, and
prevent their long-term confinement in the first place.
60.
Bagenstos, supra note 2 (citing Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson, 653 F. Supp. 2d 184,
258-59 (E.D.N.Y. 2009); Joseph S. v. Hogan, 561 F. Supp. 2d 280, 291 (E.D.N.Y. 2008); Frederick
L. v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 157 F. Supp. 2d 509, 540 (E.D. Pa. 2001)).
61.
Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 607.
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not oppose community placement but his or her guardian does. Because
the Court conceptually viewed community placement as a reasonable
accommodation, it quoted language from the Title II regulations providing
that people cannot be forced to accept a reasonable accommodation in
community placement could not be required
support of the proposition 6that
2
objection.
person's
a
over
The most controversial Olmstead element, arguably, was the third
one. The state of Georgia had asserted that inadequate funding, not
discrimination, was the reason for the plaintiffs' continued institutional
confinement.63 The lower courts and the Supreme Court rejected this
argument, but the latter showed greater sympathy for the demands this
standard imposed on state resources, while holding the following:
Unjustified isolation... is properly regarded as discrimination based
on disability.... [W]e recognize, as well, the States' need to maintain
a range of facilities for the care and treatment of persons with diverse
mental disabilities, and the States' obligation to administer services
with an even hand.... In evaluating a State's fundamental alteration

defense, the District Court must consider, in view of the resources
available to the State, not only the cost of providing community-based
care to the litigants, but also the range of services the State provides
and the State's obligation to mete out
others with mental disabilities,
64
those services equitably.
The Court elaborated on this last sentence by observing that if, for
example, the state "were to demonstrate that it had a comprehensive,
effective plan for placing qualified persons with mental disabilities in less
restrictive settings and a waiting list that moved at a reasonable pace, not
controlled by the State's endeavors to keep its institutions fully
populated," the state would have met the reasonable-modifications
standard.65 Commentators and advocates were concerned that this
interpretation of the fundamental alteration defense could serve as a brake
on deinstitutionalization efforts. 66 That fear has not come to pass. Instead,
Olmstead has come to stand for a ringing endorsement of community
integration of people with mental disabilities in multiple aspects of daily
life.
C. Recent Developments and the Expansion of Olmstead
With the start of the Obama Administration, and its announcement
that 2009 would be named "The Year of Community Living," Olmstead

62. Id. at 602-03.
63.
id. at 594-95 (citations omitted).
Id. at 597.
64.
65.
Id. at 605-06.
66. See, e.g., Mary C. Cerreto, Olmstead: The Brown v. Board of Education for Disability
Rights: Promises,Limits, and Issues, 3 LoY. J. PUB. INT. L. 47, 68 (2001).
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enforcement took off.67 The DOJ clarified, through technical guidance to
states, that integrated settings "are located in mainstream society; offer
access to community activities and opportunities at times, frequencies and
with persons of an individual's choosing; afford individuals choice in their
daily life activities; and, provide individuals with disabilities the
opportunity to interact with nondisabled persons to the fullest extent
possible." 6 Under the leadership of Civil Rights Division officials,
including its Special Counsel for Olmstead Enforcement, the DOJ brought
statewide investigations leading to letters of findings and consent decrees
on behalf of people with IIDD or psychiatric disabilities institutionalized
in Delaware, Georgia, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Puerto
Rico, and Virginia. 69 These investigations have extended Olmstead
beyond individual state institutions to include all of a state's institutions
for people with disabilities-an enforcement approach as sweeping as
federal efforts to address statewide violations of civil rights in the
historical realms of education and voting rights. Moreover, this extension
of Olmstead applied not only to traditional psychiatric institutions and
institutions for people with I/DD but also nursing homes and adult care
homes.
Perhaps the most noteworthy recent development in implementation
of the Olmstead decision is its extension to settings that go beyond
residential institutions and community-based residences. Specifically, one
prominent extension has been Olmstead's application to sheltered
workshops-both private plaintiffs and the DOJ have pursued litigation to
eliminate this segregated form of work for people with I/DD and mental
illness.7y In 2016, the DOJ sued the state of Georgia alleging that the
state's administration of the Georgia Network for Educational and
Therapeutic Support violated Title II of the ADA by unnecessarily
segregating schoolchildren with behavior related disabilities away from
their nondisabled peers.7 " Although not yet reflected in case law or
executive enforcement, there are other areas in which Olmstead may spur
development of more integrated approaches to activities of daily life, such
as supported decision-making (a less restrictive alternative to

67.
Olmstead:Community Integrationfor Everyone, ADA.Gov, https://www.ada.gov/olmstead
(last visited Apr. 17, 2019). For a discussion of the efforts to enforce Olmstead late in the Clinton

Administration and during the Bush Administration (including a critique of the latter's efforts), see
Dinerstein, supra note 43, at 18-19.
68.
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 40.
69.
Olmstead: Community Integrationfor Everyone, supra note 67.

70.

Lane v. Brown, 166 F. Supp. 3d 1180, 1184 85, 1192 (D. Or. 2016); Consent Decree at 4,

United States v. Rhode Island, No. 1:14-cv-00175 (D.R.I. Apr. 9, 2014).

71.

Complaint, United States v. Georgia, infra note 99.
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guardianship),72 sexual rights,73 and voting.74 This Article focuses on how
advocates are currently invoking Olmsteadto try to tackle different aspects
of the mass incarceration of people with disabilities.
II. THE "INTEGRATION MANDATE" AS APPLIED TO MASS
INCARCERATION

As described above, since the Supreme Court decided Olmstead in
1999, litigants have largely used the decision to argue for a shift from large
state-run institutions to community-based settings in the residential
context. However, what about when the "institutions" involved are jails
and prisons? Does the "integration mandate" still apply? The DOJ has
indicated that it does. As it notes in its guidance document75 on Title II and
criminal justice entities:
States, counties, and cities, which often administer both criminal
justice and disability service systems, have obligations under the ADA
to ensure people with mental health disabilities or I/DD receive
services in the most integrated setting appropriate to their
needs. Services such as scattered-site supported housing, Assertive
Community Treatment (ACT), crisis services, intensive case
management, respite, personal care services, behavior support, nursing
care, peer support, and supported employment services can support a

72.
Leslie Salzman, Rethinking Guardianship (Again): Substituted Decision Making as a
Violation of the Integration Mandate of Title H of the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 81 U. COLO. L.
REV. 157, 157, 193 (2010) ("[B]y limiting an individual's right to make his or her own decisions,
guardianship marginalizes the individual and often imposes a form of segregation that is not only bad
policy, but also violates the Act's mandate to provide services in the most integrated and least
restrictive manner."). For an early definition and discussion of supported decision-making, see Robert
D. Dinerstein, Implementing Legal Capacity UnderArticle 12 of the UN Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities: The Difficult Roadfrom Guardianshipto Supported Decision-Making, 19
HuM. RTs. BRIEF 8, 9-10 (2012).
Natalie M. Chin, Group Homes as Sex Police and the Role of the Olmstead Integration
73.
Mandate, 42 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 379, 379 (2018) ("Some courts have begun to expand
the reach of the integration mandate beyond the physical walls of confinement. It is through this lens
that sexual rights can rise from the shadows as an essential aspect of full community integration
alongside supports that include employment, education, and skills for daily living.").
74.
Kerrigan v. Philadelphia Bd. of Election, No. 07-687, 2008 WL 3562521, at *19 (E.D. Pa.
Aug. 14, 2008) ("[T]here are genuine issues of material fact as to whether Defendants select
inaccessible polling places and whether they give priority to providing access to voting in the most
integrated settings.").
75.
The Trump Administration has withdrawn or proposed to withdraw a number of civil rightsand disability rights-oriented guidance documents. See, e.g., Michelle Diament, Education
Department Defends Rollback of Special Ed Guidance, DISABILITY SCOOP (Oct. 24, 2017),
https://www.disabilityscoop.com/2017/10/24/ed-department-defends-rollback/24338; see also Laura
Meekler & Devlin Barrett, Trump Administration Considers Rollback of Anti-DiscriminationRules,
WASH. POST. (Jan. 3, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.comlocal/education/trump-administrationI e9-b5dfconsiders-rollback-of-anti-discrimination-rues/2019/01/02/f96347ea-046d5d3874fl ac36_story.html (discussing DO1 consideration of removal of disparate impact liability from
existing civil rights regulations). At this writing, however, there is no indication DOJ is planning to
withdraw the guidance on applicability of Title II to the criminal justice systen. Further, guidance
documents are simply articulations by federal agencies of existing regulations and legal precedent that
they are charged with enforcing. These documents do not create new law and, thus, the withdrawal of
any guidance document would not affect the reach of the ADA that we discuss in this Article."
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jurisdiction's efforts to divert people with these disabilities from the
criminal justice system and serve them in their communities.
State
and
local
governments
must prevent
unnecessary
institutionalization of people with disabilities. Governments have
complied with this obligation by using community-based treatment
services to keep people with disabilities out of the criminal justice
system. These governments have recognized that the responsibility for
effectively serving people with mental health disabilities or I/DD
cannot fall to law enforcement alone. Therefore, they ensure that their
disability service systems offer sufficient community-based services
and support criminal justice entities to coordinate with, and divert to,
76
community-based services.

Thus, according to the Department of Justice-the agency charged
with ADA Title II enforcement-there is no question that the ADA's
"integration mandate" can, and should, be applied in the criminal justice

context.
The Bazelon Center also recently noted that "[t]he avoidable
incarceration in jail of people with mental illness is a form of 'unjustified'
institutionalization" 77 and that "[d]iversion programs not only improve
public safety and public health, but they are also consistent with the
purpose of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and with the
landmark decision in Olmstead v. L. C.' 78 Although some individuals with

1/DD and mental illness do commit crimes and must be held accountable
for them when appropriate, the behavior leading to their involvement in
76.
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, EXAMPLES AND RESOURCES, supra note 32. The document also
describes how correctional facilities can comply with the integration mandate with regards to
individuals currently incarcerated:
Under Title II, state and local government entities must, among other obligations:
* Administer services, programs, and activities, including disability services, in the
most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with
disabilities.
o Examples of how local law enforcement, corrections, and justice system
leaders have facilitated compliance with this obligation:
" Established prison classification and placement procedures that
generally place prisoners with disabilities in facilities offering the
same programs and opportunities as prisoners without disabilities.
" Provided prisoners with mental health disabilities or I/DD with the
services necessary to permit them to reside and participate in the same
programs as prisoners without disabilities.
" Adopted policies to avoid unnecessarily placing prisoners with
mental health disabilities or UDD in restrictive housing, limited the
time these prisoners remain in restrictive housing, provided treatment
and enhanced opportunities for out-of-cell therapeutic activities, and
continuously monitored the mental health of prisoners in restrictive
housing. Also made reasonable modifications to conduct rules and
disciplinary, classification, and restrictive housing hearings to help
limit the number of prisoners with these disabilities unnecessarily
placed in restrictive housing.
[d.
77.
BERNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 19.
78.
LIEBOWITZ ET AL., supra note 7, at 2.
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the justice system is too frequently a result of not receiving appropriate
community-based services that address disability-related needs. Further,
due to a lack of understanding and prejudice toward individuals with
disabilities, incarceration itself often does nothing to provide a habilitative
or therapeutic environment to remedy the underlying basis for these
persons' problematic conduct. 79
As mentioned above, litigants have recently been successful in
extending Olmstead principles to settings that go beyond residential
institutions. Below are some examples of recent litigation seeking to
expand Olmstead in a manner that may be effective moving forward in
decreasing the disproportionate rate of incarceration for people with
disabilities.
A. Departmentof Justice Enforcement: Diversion
The Department of Justice has done critically important work in the
last decade in using the ADA to divert people with disabilities from the
corrections system to community-based treatment programs. Examples
include:
* Olmstead settlement agreements in Georgia (2010),8° Delaware
(2011), 8' Virginia (2012), 82 and New Hampshire (2014)83 required those
states to target community-based health services to (among others)
individuals with mental illness or I/DD who have histories of involvement
in the criminal justice system to prevent recidivism. These agreements also
required the creation of statewide crisis systems for individuals with I/DD
or mental illness, including the creation of "mobile crisis teams" to work
with law enforcement and assist with de-escalation, crisis planning, and
preventing crises that could lead to unnecessary entanglement with the
84
criminal justice system.
A 2012 settlement agreement with Portland, Oregon, led to the
creation of a crisis center available to first responders seeking to divert
e

BERNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 9; see also Position Statement on the CriminalJustice
79.
System, THE ARC OF THE UNITED STATES, https://www.thearc.org/file/16-117-The-Arcs-PositionStatements B4_Criminal-J ustice-System.pdf (last updated2014).

80.

Settlement Agreement at 11, United States v. Georgia, No. 1:10-CV-249-CAP (N.D. Ga.

October 19, 2010).
81.
Settlement Agreement at 2, United States v. Delaware, No. 1:11 -cv-00591 (D. Del. July 6,
2011).
Settlement Agreement at 3, United States v. Virginia, No. 3:12ev059-JAG (E.D. Va. July
82.
17, 2012).
Settlement Agreement at 5, United States v. New Hampshire, No. 1:12-cv-00053 (D.N.H.
83.
Feb. 12, 2014).

84. Settlement Agreement, United States v. Georgia, supra note 80 at 9-10; 16-17; Settlement
Agreement, United States v. Delaware, supra note 81 at 4-6; Settlement Agreement, United States v.
Virginia, supra note 82 at 7-9; Settlement Agreement, United States v. New Hampshire, supra note
83 at 5-8.
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individuals with disabilities from the criminal justice system into the
community mental health system. 85
* A 2018 stipulation between the United States and the Los Angeles
County Jails to amend a settlement agreement to respond to PlaintiffIntervenors' concerns regarding the integration mandate by, among other
things, modifying the language to focus release planning for prisoners with
mental illness on "individualized assessments" of the prisoners' needs,
"coordinating with community-based providers to identify available
services," and "facilitating the transition of care to community-based
providers." 8 6 In 2015, individuals with mental illness who intervened in
this ongoing litigation focused on inadequate mental health care in Los
Angeles County Jails, arguing that part of the settlement agreement
covering discharge procedures violated the ADA as well as their
constitutional rights.87 Specifically, Plaintiff-Intervenors noted that the
settlement "violates the integration mandate" by requiring the County to
provide "direct linkage" to "restrictive institutional settings for persons
with 'intense need for assistance,"' 88 which would "unnecessarily
segregate and isolate Plaintiff-Intervenors when reasonable alternatives,
such as permanent supportive housing, are available and are required to be
89
provided to those for whom they are clinically appropriate."

* A 2016 settlement agreement with Hinds County, Mississippi,
requiring the County jail to "work toward the goal of population reduction
in a manner that preserves public safety, prioritizes diversion for
unnecessary criminal justice involvement, and reduces recidivism,"
particularly for individuals with mental health disabilities. 9° The County
agreed to establish a criminal justice coordinating committee to enhance
coordination between criminal justice and mental health agencies to
prevent unnecessary arrest and detention and connect individuals with
disabilities to mental health services. 91 The agreement also requires the jail
to notify community mental health providers when releasing an inmate
with serious mental illness so the individual can transition safely into the
community.92 To aid in this transition, the jail must provide released
inmates with details related to a follow-up appointment at the relevant

85.

Settlement Agreement at 33, United States v. City of Portland, No. 3:12-cv-02265 (D. Or.

Dec. 17, 2012).
86.
Joint Stipulation to Amend Paragraph 34 of the Joint Settlement Agreement Regarding the

Los Angeles County Jails at 6, United States v. County of Los Angeles, No. 15-cv-05903 (C.D. Cal.
Dec. 6, 2018).
87.
Proposed Complaint in Intervention at 1,United States v. County of Los Angeles, No. 15-

cv-05903
88.
89.
90.

(C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2015).
Id. at 2.
Id. at 22.
Settlement Agreement at 5, United States v. Hinds Cty., No. 3:16-cv-00489 (S.D. Miss.

July 19, 2016).

91.
92.

Id. at 50-51.
Id. at 43.
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to cover the time
mental health center and give them sufficient medications
93
between release and the scheduled appointment.
* Consent decrees with the Baltimore Police Department 94 and
Ferguson Police Department95 included provisions to advance policies and
training for officers to improve coordination with community behavioral
health providers, divert people with mental disabilities to the behavioral
health system rather than jails or hospitals, and require the implementation
of a Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) first-responder model to assist in
deescalating crises, reducing unnecessary force, minimizing arrests,
referring individuals to the behavioral health crisis system, and overall
reducing the inappropriate involvement of individuals with mental
disabilities in the criminal justice system.
B. United States v. Georgia and Georgia Advocacy Office v. Georgia:
Disrupting the School-to-PrisonPipelinefor Students with
Disabilities
One case this Article briefly mentioned above, United States v.
Georgia,96 is an Olmstead case in the education realm that has implications
for the school-to-prison pipeline.9 7 In 2015, the DOJ investigated
Georgia's state-wide program--the Georgia Network for Educational and
Therapeutic Support (GNETS)-and found that it violated Title II of the
ADA by: (1) unnecessarily segregating students with disabilities from
their peers; and (2) providing opportunities to GNETS students that were
unequal to those provided to other students throughout the state. 98 The
investigation eventually culminated in a 2016 lawsuit against the state,
alleging that the state's administration of the GNETS system violated the
ADA's integration mandate by "unnecessarily segregating students with
disabilities from their peers" and providing "unequal" educational
opportunity to GNETS students.99 In 2017, the DOJ's lawsuit was put on
hold pending a decision from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit regarding the DOJ's authority to bring suit.1"' Later that year,
parents of children with disabilities and advocacy groups filed a class

93.
Id.
Consent Decree, United States v. Police Dep't, No. 1:17-cv-00099-JKB (D. Md. January
94.
12, 2017).
Consent Decree, United States v. City of Ferguson, No. 4:16-cv-00180-CDP (D. Ed. Mo.
95.
April 19, 2016).

96.

Complaint, United States v. Georgia, infra note 99, at 1-4.

By using the phrase school-to-prison pipeline, this Article refers to the varying forces that
97.
shuttle students with disabilities from segregated and inferior schools straight into the juvenile justice

system.
of

Letter from Vanita Gupta, Principal Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., to Nathan Deal, Governor
98.
15,
2015),
(July
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Att'y
Olens,
Sam
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https://www.ada.gov/olmstead/documents/gnets-lof.pdf.
99.
Complaint at 1, United States v. Georgia, No. 1:16-CV-03088 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 23, 2016)
[hereinafter Complaint, United States v. Georgia] at 1-2, 23.
Order at 3-4, United States v. Georgia, No.1 : 16-CV-03088 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 11, 2017).
100.
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action lawsuit in federal court" ° ' alleging that: (1) the state of Georgia
discriminated against thousands of public school students with disabilities
by providing them with a separate and unequal education via GNETS; and
(2) the state, in denying GNETS students the opportunity to be educated
with their nondisabled peers in neighborhood schools, violates the ADA,
02
Section 504, and the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.'
Throughout, the state has continued to defend the GNETS program.
The state of Georgia is unique in having established a statewide
educational program---GNETS-that systematically segregates students
with behavioral disabilities. Over 5,000 students with disabilities, the
disproportionate majority of whom are African-American, have been sent
to the GNETS centers. 0 3 Most of the GNETS centers are housed in
completely separate schools (including some that were formerly schools
for African-American students in the Jim Crow days)." ° Other GNETS
centers are kept inside regular schools; however, they are typically housed
in separate, locked wings or only accessible through separate entrances,
meaning they effectively operate as a separate school within the school. 05
As described in both complaints, GNETS students are not only
segregated from their nondisabled peers, but these students also receive an
inferior education. Typically, GNETS students are not taught by certified
teachers-many are primarily taught through computers.' 0 6 Students
cannot access the basic classes they need to earn a diploma, resulting in a
graduation rate for GNETS students of only 10% (compared to a statewide
rate of nearly 80%).107 Many GNETS centers do not provide access to
basic school services like gyms, libraries, or science labs.' 0 s In addition,
101.

One of the Authors of this Article, Shira Wakschlag, is directly involved in this litigation

as counsel for The Arc, a plaintiff in the action, along with the Georgia Advocacy Office and class
counsel, the Center for Public Representation, the Bazelon Center, the Goodmark Law Firm, and DLA
Piper LLP.

102.
Class Action Complaint at 2-3, Ga. Advocacy Office v. Georgia, No. 1:1 7-cv-03999 (N.D.
Ga. Oct. 11, 2017) [hereinafter Class Action Complaint, Ga. Advocacy Office v. Georgia].
103.
Id.at 3.
104.

Id. at 28-29.

105.

Id. at 3-4, 29; Complaint, United States v. Georgia, supra note 99, at 13; see also Letter

from Vanita Gupta, supra note 98; Rachel Aviv, Georgia'sSeparate and Unequal Special-Education
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ATLANTA
J.-CONST.
(May
5,
2016),
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ATLANTA
J.-CONST.
(Apr.
28,
2016),

http://specials.myajc.com/psychoeducation/?ecmp=AJC-internallink_4292016-AJCtoMyAJC-psyc
ho ed atlanta; Alan Judd, Physical Restraint Common at PsychoeducationalSchools, ATLANTA J.CONST. (May 8, 2016), http://specials.myajc.com/psychoedrestraint [hereinafter Judd, Physical
Restraint Common at PsychoeducationalSchools]; Timothy Pratt, The Separate, UnequalEducation
of
Students
with
Special
Needs,
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(Mar.
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2017),
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Class Action Complaint, Ga. Advocacy Office v. Georgia, supranote 102, at 30.
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Id. at 31.
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Id. at 28.

2019]

ADA 'S "INTEGRATION MANDA TE"

GNETS students are deprived of important co-curricular opportunities that
other students enjoy, such as playing sports or participating in the school
play. 0 9 Thus, GNETS students are denied the many positive educational
benefits available in their zoned schools, such as learning appropriate
social skills and behaviors, responding to higher educational expectations,
to learning, and receiving, overall, a better
experiencing fewer disruptions
0
education."
of
quality
GNETS also uses harsh and ineffective techniques to manage student
behavior, including physical restraint. The Atlanta Journal-Constitution
reported that, during a two-year period, GNETS students were physically
restrained nearly 10,000 times. "' That number is almost five times greater
than the combined number of restraints occurring in approximately 2,300
other Georgia schools during this same time period. 112
Overall, the atmosphere at GNETS centers is punitive rather than
educational. Parents and students have described GNETS as similar to a
prison system, with no way out. "1 3 As the complaint notes:
Although advertised as "therapeutic," GNETS are anything but. At
GNETS, students do not receive the services they need to improve
their behavior. Often, their behavior worsens when placed in GNETS
because of the harsh and punitive atmosphere that prevails. Staff
routinely use physical restraints and otherwise rely on harsh and
ineffective methods of discipline.... GNETS are..."dumping
grounds" used by the State and local school districts for students whom
local school districts do not want to educate. 114
In a recent article in The New Yorker magazine, featuring an in-depth
investigation of the GNETS system, the grandmother of a GNETS student
was quoted as referring to it as a "pipeline-to-prison program," and the
mother of a GNETS student said that her son had internalized the punitive
experience of the program so deeply that "he has begun to introduce
himself to strangers by saying, 'Hi, I'm Jamir, I'm bad.""'5
The plaintiffs in both the DOJ and private cases argue that GNETS'
practice of segregating students with behavior-related disabilities in an
inferior educational system, when they could be served in their zoned
schools if the state provided the appropriate supports to which they are
entitled, violates the ADA's integration mandate. "6 At the time of this

109. Id. at 30-31.
110. Id. at 3-5.
111.
Id. at 32.
112. Judd, PhysicalRestraint Common at Psychoeducational Schools, supra note 105.
Letter from Vanita Gupta, supra note 98.
113.
114. Class Action Complaint, Ga. Advocacy Office v. Georgia, supra note 102, at 4, 27.
115.
Aviv, supra note 105.
Class Action Complaint, Ga. Advocacy Office v. Georgia, supra note 102, at 5; Complaint,
116.
United States v. Georgia, supra note 99, at 1-2.
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writing, the court has not yet ruled on the state's motion to dismiss in either
the DOJ or the private actions.
When students with behavior-related disabilities are placed in
punitive, inferior, and segregated programs that do not offer meaningful
educational opportunities or therapeutic supports, a cycle of low
expectations and punishment ensues, often leading to the school-to-prison
pipeline for these students. Challenging such programs as a violation of
the ADA's integration mandate is, thus, one avenue through which
litigants may be able to use Olmstead to disrupt the school-to-prison
pipeline, which results in the disproportionate incarceration of individuals

with disabilities. 117
C. Seth v. D.C.: Challenging UnjustifiedImprisonment
Markelle Seth is a twenty-five-year-old African-American resident
of the District of Columbia (DC or the District) with intellectual disability
who is languishing in federal prison despite not having been convicted of
a crime. 118 Mr. Seth has filed a civil rights lawsuit" 9 alleging that DC and
its Department on Disability Services (DDS)-the agency charged with
providing home- and community-based services (HCBS) to eligible
residents with I/DD-has (among other allegations) violated the ADA's
integration mandate by failing to provide him with services and treatment
in the most integrated setting appropriate to his needs. 2 0
When Mr. Seth was twenty, he was charged in federal court with
sexual offenses involving children who lived in his household."'2 The
court ordered a series of evaluations to determine whether Mr. Seth was
competent to stand trial. 22
' Based on these evaluations, the court concluded
that Mr. Seth was not competent to stand trial and that there was no
23
reasonable likelihood that he would ever become so. 1
After Mr. Seth was charged, but before he was found unrestorable to
competency, the District-through DDS-found him eligible for its

117.
See also First Amended Class Action Complaint, S.S. v. City of Springfield, No. 3:14-cv30116-MGM (D. Ma. February, 11 2015) (alleging that the City of Springfield operates a
discriminatory public school system denying hundreds of children with mental health disabilities equal

educational opportunity and the opportunity to be educated with their peers without a disability in
violation of the ADA's integration mandate). The court denied class certification and granted the

defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings. Memorandum and Order on Defendants' Motion
For Judgment On The Pleadings, S.S. v. City of Springfield, No. 3:14-cv-30116-MGM (D. Ma. July
19, 2018). The plaintiffs have appealed. Brief of Appellants/Cross-Appellees, The Parent/Professional
Advocacy League v. City of Springfield, No. 18-1778 (1 st Cir. December 10, 2018).
118.
Complaint at 2, Seth v. District of Columbia, No. 1:18-cv-01034 (D.D.C. May 1, 2018)

[hereinafter Complaint, Seth v. District of Columbia].
119.
Both Authors of this Article are involved directly in this case as counsel for Mr. Seth, along
with lawyers from the Skadden and Brown, Goldstein & Levy law firms.
120.
Complaint, Seth v. District of Columbia, supra note 118, at 3.
121.
Id.
122.
Id.
123.
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community-based services due to his intellectual disability. 124 DDS
retained an expert to conduct a thorough evaluation of Mr. Seth, who
concluded that Mr. Seth is not a predator and, with comprehensive
supervision by appropriately trained staff, and an array of specifically
identified treatment and services, he could be placed in a community
setting in the District without creating a substantial risk to the public. 125
DDS subsequently identified an appropriate community-based program
willing to accept Mr. Seth and provide all of the supervision and services
recommended by its expert. 126 DDS also stated that, based on its
evaluation, if Mr. Seth were found unrestorable to competence, it would
petition to civilly commit him under a local DC statute-the only available
means for the District to remove him from federal custody and provide
services through a selected
him with supervised community-based
1 27
provider in the DC community.
Nevertheless, after a change in DDS leadership, the agency
inexplicably changed its position and refused to assume responsibility for,
and take custody of, Mr. Seth, resulting in his civil commitment to the
custody of the Attorney General and confinement in a BOP facility. 128 The
BOP is required by statute to release Mr. Seth to the District's custody if
the District moves for civil29 commitment and provides the services for
which Mr. Seth is eligible. 1
The BOP assigned Mr. Seth to the Federal Medical Center (FMC)
Butner (North Carolina), a prison with medical services that describes
itself as "[a]n administrative security federal medical center."' 13 On May
1, 2018, to challenge the District's failure to provide services to him in
DC, Mr. Seth sued the District and DDS in the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia, alleging violations of the ADA, Section 504,
As a result of the long-running, but now concluded, litigation in Evans v. Bowser, 87 F.
124.
Supp. 3d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2015), DC's lone congregate institution for people with intellectual disability,
Forest Haven, has been closed since 1991. Thus, class members, as well as all other District residents
with intellectual disability who need residential habilitative services receive them in community-based
programs. See Martin Austermuhle, After ForestHaven Closed, Deaths Came to D.C. Group Homes,
2016),
15,
(Mar.
WAMU

https://wamu.org/story/16/03/15/after an institutionclosed deaths came to dc.group-homes.
125.
126.
127.

Complaint, Seth v. District of Columbia, supra note 118, at 4-5.
Id.
Id. at4.

128.

Id.at 5.

129.

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4246(a) (2018), federal civil commitment is inappropriate if the

state makes "suitable arrangements for State custody and care of the person." Section 4246(d) provides
that "[t]he Attorney General shall release the person to the appropriate official of the State in which
the person is domiciled or was tried if such State will assume responsibility for his custody, care, and
treatment. The Attorney General shall make all reasonable efforts to cause such a State to assume such

responsibility."
130.
Complaint, Seth v. District of Columbia, supra note 118, at 7; FMC Butner, FED. BUREAU
PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/locations/institutions/buh/index.jsp (last visited Apr. 17, 2019).
Subsequently, BOP transferred Mr. Seth to Federal Medical Center Devens (Massachusetts).
Amended Complaint at 11 n.6, Seth v. District of Columbia, No. 1:18-cv-01034 (D.D.C. Oct. 26,
2018) [hereinafter Amended Complaint, Seth v. District of Columbia]. Both FMC Butner and FMC

Devens are far from Mr. Seth's home in the District of Columbia.
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the D.C. Human Rights Act of 1997,13 1 and the Citizens with Intellectual
Disabilities Civil Rights Restoration Act of 2015.132 In particular, he
alleged that the District's failure to provide him with services and
treatment in the most integrated setting appropriate constituted unjustified
isolation in violation of Olmstead, and disparate impact discrimination
under the ADA, because the District regularly provides community-based
supervisory services to DC residents who are found not competent to stand
trial due to mental illness through the Department of Behavioral Health.
However, the District is failing to do so for those with intellectual
disability. 133 The complaint states:
As in Olmstead, numerous professionals, including DDS's own
professionals, who have treated and evaluated Markelle, have
concluded that he can and should be served in the community,
Markelle wants to return to and be treated in the District, and there are
community-based options available to him that can both meet his
needs and provide for the community's security. By refusing to serve
Markelle, DDS leaves him in a federal prison facility-often in
segregated housing-that is unable to provide the necessary treatment,
34
safe facilities, and integrated services required by the ADA. 1
Following the filing of the lawsuit, DDS's prior director stated in a
declaration that "the decision by DDS to allow Mr. Seth to languish and
regress in federal custody rather than carry out its mission and mandate
35
[is] inexplicable other than as a matter of discrimination."'1
As described in the civil rights complaint against the District, during
his federal incarceration, Mr. Seth is often cited for violations of the rules,
such as not removing his headphones quickly enough, disagreeing with
other inmates about what television channel to watch, or not tucking in his
shirt. 3 6 As a result, he has spent much of his time in solitary
confinement,' 37 which is both nontherapeutic and harmful to people with
intellectual disability. His "therapy" has consisted of, for example, petting
a dog through a slot in his solitary confinement cell. 3 8

131.

D.C. CODE § 2-1401.01 (2019).

132.
Id. § 7-1301.01. The Disability Services Reform Amendment Act of 2018, which amends
this statute, was enacted on March 12, 2018. 65 D.C. Reg. 2,823 (Mar. 12, 2018). This statute
eliminates civil commitment for most individuals with intellectual disability moving forward but keeps
intact the current procedures regarding individuals like Mr. Seth who are found incompetent to stand
trial in criminal cases. Id.
133.
Amended Complaint, Seth v. District of Columbia, supra note 130, at 56, 67-68;
Complaint, Seth v. District of Columbia, supra note 118, at 33, 42-43.
134.
Amended Complaint, Seth v. District of Columbia, supra note 130, at 70; Complaint, Seth
v. District of Columbia, supra note 118, at 44.
135.
Exhibit 1, Declaration of Laura L. Nuss at 10, Seth v. District of Columbia, No. 1:18-cv01034 (D.D.C. Oct. 26, 2018).
136.
Complaint, Seth v. District of Columbia, supra note 118, at 27.
137.
Id.
138.
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As noted by Nancy Thaler, a nationally renowned expert on best
practices in I/DD services, who filed a declaration in support of Mr. Seth,
it is well-established that the problematic behavior of individuals with
I!DD often worsens within the rigid confines of prison life. 3 9 People with
I/DD may have considerable difficulty understanding the purpose behind
rules and the consequences that come when violating them. They also may
be frightened by the lack of supportive behavior from prison personnel.
For those who cannot effectively communicate their dissatisfaction
verbally, they may act out how they are feeling in ways that do not
conform with the rules. For those who have experienced trauma, such as
Mr. Seth, this environment can be particularly destructive. 4' 0 Thus, Mr.
Seth's continued segregation is likely to have a negative long-term impact
on his mental health and may lead to the deterioration of his daily living
skills. The vicious cycle he is currently experiencing, which consists "of
triggers and punishments followed by triggers and more punishment," is
precisely what justifies prioritizing people in Mr. Seth's situation for
community placements rather than incarceration in prisons.'14' According
to Ms. Thaler, supporting in-the-community individuals with J/DD who
have committed criminal offenses, including sexual offenses, is common
practice throughout the United States. 142 It is well-established that people
in Mr. Seth's situation, and others with IIDD exhibiting problematic
behaviors, can live successfully in the community without presenting a
harm to others, provided they receive appropriate training, treatment, and
supervision. 14 "Indeed, DDS's own retained expert stated that [Mr. Seth]
should be returned to the District, where he [could] be placed in a
supervisory program without posing a danger to himself or others."'"
In his proposed amended complaint, Mr. Seth alleges that the District
has authority to take custody of him and has HCBS waiver slots (matched
with federal funding) sufficient to provide services to him. "' The District
also has a qualified and experienced provider ready and willing to serve
Mr. Seth with one-on-one staff supervision, appropriate housing with
limited opportunity to interact with children, therapy, sex education with
the Georgetown Developmental Disability Administration Health
Initiative, an on-call crisis team, behavior management, and
' Thus, the only barrier to providing Mr. Seth
environmental safety plans. 46
with the most integrated setting appropriate to his needs-namely, a DCbased disability-services provider organization that can provide him with

139.
cv-01034
140.
141.
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143.
144.
145.
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Exhibit 2, Declaration of Nancy Thaler at 2, 10-11, Seth v. District of Columbia, No. 1:18(D.D.C. Oct. 26, 2018).
Id. at 14.
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Amended Complaint, Seth v. District of Columbia, supra note 130, at 4.
Complaint, Seth v. District of Columbia, supra note 118, at 3.
Amended Complaint, Seth v. District of Columbia, supra note 130, at 4, 47.
See id. at 34-37.
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47
needed supervision in the community-is the District's refusal to do so.1
Mr. Seth claims that this is a violation of Olmstead's integration
48
mandate.'

On September 28, 2018, the federal district court in DC granted DC's
motion to dismiss the complaint with prejudice, noting: "While a
discrimination action is a creative effort to bring attention to this troubling
situation, the allegations fail to support claims under the antidiscrimination
laws and ultimately cannot provide the relief Seth seeks."'' 49 Without
explaining the reasoning behind granting the motion to dismiss with
prejudice, the judge noted that, among other things, Mr. Seth's Olmstead
claim failed because it consisted of just "bare allegations" without any
"specific allegations supporting the claim that he was denied
accommodations-that is, community-based services-by the defendants
due to his intellectual disability."' 50 Based on the dangerousness finding
made by the U.S. District Court for the District of North Carolina, the DC
federal court concluded that:
Although the defendants may, at one time, have believed that
community-based services would be an appropriate alternative for
Seth, their decision not to move forward with accepting responsibility
for his custody, care, and treatment indicates that they no longer find
community-based treatment appropriate.... This argument rests on
the assumption that "the defendants are obligated to provide services
to [Seth] despite his being in federal custody and his federal civil
commitment." No such obligation exists. 151
Furthermore, the court rejected plaintiff's unjustified isolation claim,
which also was based on Olmstead. Even though the court concluded that
Mr. Seth had not satisfied two of the three Olmstead factors (in part
because of his alleged dangerousness and the District's refusal to serve
him based on his presence in federal custody), it significantly did not
5
conclude that Olmstead was inapplicable in a criminal justice setting.
Mr. Seth filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, along with a
request for leave to file an amended complaint, in late 2018.15 1 In his
motion, Mr. Seth argues that the district court committed clear error when
147.

As discussed infra, and as noted above with regard to Olmstead, a state may attempt to

show that providing community-based services to a person found incompetent to stand trial constitutes
a fundamental alteration of its program or services if no such programs exist. Whatever the merits of
such a defense in a federal prison context, the existence of a well-functioning, community-based
services system in the District of Columbia, including the identification of a specific program that can
provide appropriate services to Mr. Seth, negates its viability in the Seth case.
148.
149.

Amended Complaint, Seth v. District of Columbia, supra note 130, at 3-4, 49-50.
Seth v. D.C., No. 18-103 (BAH), 2018 WL 4682023, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 28, 2018).
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it dismissed his complaint with prejudice, because such dismissals are
warranted only in extraordinary circumstances where no set of facts could
cure the alleged deficiencies.154 In contrast, here, the judge explicitly
identified specific missing factual information as the basis for its
dismissal.155 Ordinarily, plaintiffs should be afforded the ability to amend
a complaint that a judge finds lacking in sufficient facts to survive a motion
' In 2019, the court denied this motion and Mr. Seth has filed
to dismiss. 56
a notice of appeal.15 7
D. M.G. v. Cuomo: Demanding Expansion of Community-Based Mental
Health Housing
In early 2019, Disability Rights New York and the Legal Aid Society
filed a class action lawsuit in the Southern District of New York158 on
behalf of New York inmates with mental illness who have completed their
sentences or reached their approved parole dates but are being held in
prison (some in solitary confinement) due to a lack of community-based
59
mental health housing programs available to serve them upon release.
As noted in the complaint: "While residing in prison pending a vacancy in
a community-based mental health housing program, Plaintiffs are not free
to come and go or participate in community life. Plaintiffs are locked in
secure prison facilities, have no autonomy and no privacy, and continue to
be treated as prisoners.""16 In addition to constitutional claims, the
complaint alleges violations of the ADA and Section 504 for the state's
"failure to provide services to Plaintiffs in the most integrated setting." 161
Defendants-Governor Cuomo, the New York State Office of
Mental Health, and the New York State Department of Corrections and
Community Supervision-share responsibility for discharging people
with serious mental illness from prison, including by planning for and
approving housing in the community to which they may be released and
providing a comprehensive discharge plan to each person with serious

154.
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment
and Rule 15(a)(2) Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint at 8-9, Seth v. District of Columbia,
No. 18-103 (BAH) (D.D.C. Oct. 26, 2018) (No. 1:1 8-cv-01034) [hereinafter Memorandum in Support

of Plaintiff s Rule 59(e) Motion, Seth v. District of Columbia].
155.
156.

Seth, 2018WL4682023, at*8-11,*13 16.
As part of its motion, counsel filed a proposed amended complaint and included several

additional declarations, including some referenced above, in support of the Olmstead allegations in
the complaint. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Rule 59(e) Motion, Seth v. District ofColumbia,
supra note 154, at 1, 8.
157.
Order, Seth v. District of Columbia, No. 1:1 8-cv-01034 (D.D.C. March 8, 2019); Plaintiffs
Notice of Appeal, Seth v. District of Columbia, No. 1:1 8-cv-01 034 (D.D.C. June 7, 2019).
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TIMES (Jan. 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/23/nyregion/prisoners-mentally-illlawsuit.html.
Class Action Complaint at 1-2, M.G. v. Cuomo, No. 7:19-cv-00639 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23,
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mental illness preparing to return to the community from prison.' 62
Plaintiffs allege that their continued confinement in prison is not based on
defendants' determination that such placement is clinically necessary but
that they are confined solely because defendants have failed to provide
63
sufficient housing and supportive services in more integrated settings.'
The lawsuit seeks an injunction requiring defendants to create an
effective plan for community integration, which includes developing a
sufficient array of community-based mental health housing for members
of the class. As the complaint notes: "Plaintiffs do not seek an order
requiring their release from prison. Rather, Plaintiffs ask that Defendants
make release possible by developing the community-based mental health
housing programs that Defendants have imposed as a precondition for
Plaintiffs' discharge from prison, and by creating an effective plan for
community integration."'' " The complaint notes that New York already
has a continuum of residential services to integrate people with serious
mental illness being released from prison into the community, but that
existing programs and services "have been developed and administered in
a manner and on a scale that are inadequate for Plaintiffs' needs, resulting
inunlawful, unconstitutional, and unnecessary institutionalization in state
prisons." ' At the time of this writing, the defendants had yet to respond
to the complaint. 166
E. United States v. Nino and United States v. Collins: Challenging
Inpatient Competency Restoration Programs
United States v. Nino 67 and United States v. Collins'68 stand as two
recent examples of protection and advocacy organizations filing briefs in
criminal cases as amicus curiae to provide input to the court on more
appropriate placements for defendants with intellectual disability in
competency restoration proceedings under Section 504.
In Nino, the Arizona Disability Law Center and the William E.
Morris Institute for Justice filed an amicus curiae brief on May 10, 2018,
before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing
162.
163.

Id. at 24-25.
Id. at 33.

164.
Id. at 3.
165.
Id. at 34.
166.
It is worth mentioning that this case shares similar themes with the 1966 U.S. Supreme
Court case, Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 108-09 (1966), with regard to New York's practice of
confining inmates with mental illness beyond their imposed sentences without procedural safeguards

in place. In Baxstrom, the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause required that a prisoner nearing
the end of his sentence in the New York Department of Correction hospital for mentally ill prisoners

must be given a jury review of the determination of his sanity in order to conform with proceedings
granted to others in the state who were civilly committed. Id. at 110. The Court further held that such
a prisoner was entitled to an additional hearing to determine whether he was "so dangerously mentally
ill" that he must remain in the state's correctional hospital. Id. at 112-13. Given that the case was
brought prior to the enactment of Section 504 and the ADA, these claims were not raised.
167.
168.

750 F. App'x 589 (9th Cir. 2019).
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that the mandatory detention in a locked inpatient facility of individuals
found incompetent to stand trial-without an individualized determination
of the most integrated setting appropriate for their needs-violates
Section 504.

'

As described above, Section 504, on which the ADA is

based, prohibits undue institutionalization of individuals with disabilities
and requires the federal government (and any program or activity
receiving federal financial assistance) to conduct its programs and
activities in the most integrated setting appropriate for the individual with
' The regulations for Section 504 require recipients of federal
a disability. 70
funds to "administer programs and activities in the most integrated setting
appropriate to the needs of qualified handicapped persons."171
In this case, the United States filed charges against the defendant, an
individual with intellectual disability, for knowingly making a false and
fictitious statement during the purchase of firearms when he checked "yes"
in response to whether he was the actual buyer of the firearms at issue,72
because he was actually purchasing the firearms for another individual. 1
The defendant was found incompetent to stand trial and remanded to the
custody of the Attorney General for competency restoration in a locked
inpatient federal medical center run by the federal BOP. 173 The defendant
filed an interlocutory appeal with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to
challenge the district court's order placing him with BOP. 174 The Arizona
Disability Law Center and the William E. Morris Justice Institution,
through an amicus curiae brief, supported the defendant before the Ninth
Circuit. 171

The amicus brief argues that, under Section 504, the Attorney
General and BOP are required to make reasonable accommodations with
regard to how they deliver competency restoration services to comply with
Section 504's integration mandate and the DOJ's corresponding
regulations.' 76 The argument is based on the notion that the Olmstead
decision applies equally to programs and activities receiving federal
financial assistance, some of which are covered only by Section 504 and
not the ADA, given explicit statements by Congress, the Executive branch,
169.
Redacted Proposed Brief by Amici Curiae in Support of Defendant-Appellant at 1-3,
United States v. Nino, 750 F. App'x. 589 (9th Cir. 2019) (No. 4:16-cr-01937).
See 29 U.S.C § 794(a) (2018).
170.
Guidelines for Determining Discriminatory Practices, 43 Fed. Reg. 2,138 (Jan. 13, 1978);
171.
see also 28 C.F.R. § 39.130(d) (2019) (quoting DOJ Section 504 regulations, using identical
language). This Section 504 integration regulation was the model for the comparable one DOJ
promulgated in its ADA Title 11 regulation and that was at the heart of the Court's decision in
Olmstead. See Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 591-92 (1999).
Indictment at 1-2, United States v. Nino, No. 4:16-cr-01937 (D. Ariz. Oct. 12, 2016), affd,
172.
750 F. App'x 589 (9th Cir. 2019).
United States v. Nino, No. 4:16-cr-01937 (D. Ariz. Nov. 17, 2017), affd, 750 F. App'x 589
173.
(9th Cir. 2019).
Nino, 750 F. App'x at 589.
174.
Redacted Proposed Brief by Amici Curiae in Support of Defendant-Appellant, supra note
175.

169, at 2.
176.
Id. at 12.
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and the courts, noting that the two statutes should be interpreted
consistently. 177

Under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d), when a hearing demonstrates by a
preponderance of the evidence that a defendant is not mentally competent
to stand trial, the court "shall commit the defendant to the custody of the
Attorney General."' 8 The statute goes on to explain:
The Attorney General shall hospitalize the defendant for treatment in
a suitable facility-(1) for such a reasonable period of time, not to
exceed four months, as is necessary to determine whether there is a
substantial probability that in the foreseeable future he will attain the
capacity to permit the proceedings to go forward; and (2) for an
additional reasonable period of time until-(A) his mental condition is
so improved that trial may proceed, if the court finds that there is a
substantial probability that within such additional period of time he
will attain the capacity to permit the proceedings to go forward; or (B)
the pending charges against him are disposed of according to law;
whichever is earlier. 179
The BOP operates five federal medical centers, each of which is a
locked inpatient medical institution in a prison complex.' 8 0 The process of
assessing the need for competency restoration of an inmate does not
include an individualized determination of the most integrated setting
appropriate for the individual to receive this service and, even if it did, the
only placement currently available for such a program is the federal
8
medical centers.' '
Competency restoration services fall within the DOJ's program and
activities subject to Section 504. Most, if not all, individuals found
incompetent to stand trial under 18 U.S.C. § 424 1(a) (a person "presently
suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally
incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and
consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his
defense") will meet Section 504's definition of an individual with a
disability, because the person would have a mental impairment that
substantially limits at least one major life activity.1 82 Thus, individuals
with disabilities who are able to participate in outpatient competency
restoration services in their communities, and are not opposed to doing so,
are being denied a community-based option in violation of Section 504.
Mandatory detention in an inpatient institution for all individuals found
177.

See supra notes 35-36.

178.
179.

18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) (2018).
Id.

180.
Redacted Proposed Brief by Amici Curiae in Support of Defendant-Appellant, supra note
169, at 4-5.
181.
Id. at 5.
182.
18 U.S.C. § 4241(d). See 28 C.F.R. § 39.103 (2019), for Section 504 definition of
"handicapped."
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incompetent to stand trial precludes an individualized assessment of their
needs and placement in the most integrated setting where their needs can
be met. As the brief notes: "The absence of a continuum of competency
restoration services in less restrictive settings and the allocation of all
results in unjustified segregation of
resources to institutional placements
83
disabilities."1
mental
with
people
The brief further explains that twenty-nine states and the District of
Columbia allow for community-based and outpatient competency
restoration as a treatment option.' 84 These community-based programs
allow participants to "attempt competency remediation without losing
liberty, employment, income from employment or Social Security
benefits, and housing. Participants avoid disruption in continuity of
services, treatment, or care from community service providers and access
to their support5 system .... participants receive services in a familiar
environment."

Anticipating a fundamental alteration defense, the brief adds that
community-based competency restoration programs cost less than
inpatient commitment and do not alter the nature of these programs. The
brief explains that the state governments that have implemented such
programs actually benefit from having a continuum of treatment and
services available as they have seen reduced recidivism rates and cost
savings.' 86 Lastly, the brief argues that the apparent statutory conflict
between Section 504 and 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) can only be reconciled by
interpreting the latter as not requiring mandatory inpatient commitment
without an individualized determination.' 87 The Ninth Circuit denied the
petition for rehearing' 88 without addressing the Section 504 argument. Mr.
Nino then filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme
Court.189 At the time of this writing, this motion remains pending.

In Collins, Disability Rights Oregon filed an amicus curiae brief
before the United States District Court for the District of Oregon on behalf
of a defendant with intellectual disability who was charged with tax fraud,
found incompetent to stand trial, and, thus, at risk of being sent to a federal
1 90
medical center under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) for competency restoration.
The briefs arguments in Collins largely mirror the ones in Nino--that
mandatory inpatient competency restoration at federal medical centers,
183.

Redacted Proposed Brief by Amici Curiae in Support of Defendant-Appellant, supra note

169, at 16.
For a full list of relevant state statutes providing for community-based competency
184.
restoration programs, see id. at 17 n. 15.

185.

Id. at 20.

186.
187.
188.
189.

Id. at 20-21.
Id. at 21-24.
United States v. Nino, 750 Fed. App'x. 589, 589-90 (9th Cir. 2019).
Motion to Stay the Mandate, United States v. Nino, No. 17-10546 (9th Cir. May 2, 2019).

190.

Motion for Leave to File an Amicus Curiae Brief at 1-4, United States v. Collins, No. 3:16-

cr-00352-HZ-02 (D. Or. Oct. 19, 2018).
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absent an individualized determination of the most integrated setting
appropriate, violates Section 504. 91 The Collins brief emphasizes that a
community-based competency restoration program is a currently available
alternative for the defendant in Oregon, and the federal medical centers do
not provide any information about their capacity to individually tailor their
programs or appropriately accommodate individuals with intellectual
disability, rendering such placement unduly restrictive and inappropriate
for the defendant. 92 The brief further notes that sending the defendant to
a federal medical center will cause him to "lose all established supports,
placing him at risk of recidivism and harming his ability to reintegrate
following the period of his restoration services."19' 3 In an order from the
district court in December 2018 that does not address the arguments in the
amicus curiae brief, the judge ordered the defendant committed to the
custody of the Attorney General pending a report on its compliance with
the commitment statute. 9 4 At the time of this writing, Mr. Collins has filed
a notice of appeal. 95
'
F. People v. McCollum: ChallengingInappropriatePlacementin a
Locked PsychiatricInstitution
On December 20, 2018, several national disability advocacy groups
filed an amicus curiae brief' 96 before the Second Appellate Division of the
New York Supreme Court in support of defendant Darius McCollum's
motion for leave to appeal his commitment order.' 97 The case, People v.
McCollum,198 involves an individual with autism who has repeatedly been
charged with the unauthorized operation of New York city trains and
buses.' 99 In response to the most recent charge at issue in this case, Mr.
McCollum pleaded not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect
and sought conditional release under a court order that would allow him
to receive appropriate, community-based services tailored to his needs for
191.
Id.at 10.
192.
Id.atlO-13.
193.
Id. at 11. In addition to the Section 504 argument, the brief outlines a due process argument
against inpatient competency restoration that is beyond the scope of this Article. Id. at 13-18.
194.
Order at 1, United States v. Collins, No. 3:16-cr-00352-HZ-02 (D. Or. Dec. 14, 2018) ("The
Court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant is presently suffering from a mental
disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to stand trial. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4241,
Defendant is committed to the custody of the Attorney General. The Court orders the Attorney General
to issue a report showing compliance with the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 4247 before requiring
Defendant to surrender to BOP custody.").
195.
Notice of Appeal, United States v. Collins, No. 3:16-cr-00352-HZ-02 (D. Or. March 4,
2019).
196.
Notice of Motion of The Bazelon Center For Mental Health Law, The Autistic Self
Advocacy Network, The Arc of the United States, and The National Disability Rights Network for
Leave to File Brief as Amici Curiae at 1 2, People v. McCollum, No. 2018-14953 (N.Y. App. Div.
Dec. 20, 2018).
197.
These groups included The Arc, the Autistic Self Advocacy Network, the Bazelon Center
for Mental Health Law, and the National Disability Rights Network. Shira Wakschlag, one of this
Article's Authors, was involved in the drafting of the brief on behalf of The Arc. Id.
198.
No. 51424, slip op. (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 5, 2018).
199.
Id. at 2.
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the first time in his life. 2°° The trial court accepted his plea, but found him
to have a "dangerous mental disorder" under state law because of his
autism and ordered him to be committed to a secure psychiatric facility for
the most dangerous and violent offenders. 2 ' The trial court ordered this
disposition even though Mr. McCollum had never committed a violent
crime, the court explicitly acknowledged that it is unprecedented for a
nonviolent offender to be committed to such a facility, and Mr. McCollum
did not fit the factors the court had outlined for a finding of
dangerousness. 20° This opinion is also the first in New York to find an
individual to have a "dangerous mental disorder" because of autism, a
developmental disability.203
The amicus curiae brief argues that involuntary confinement is not
appropriate for a person with a developmental or other disability for whom
2°
community-based services can provide effective behavioral supports.
The brief notes that the trial court decision reflects a fundamental failure
to understand either the importance of community-based services and
supports or the difference between mental health and developmental
disability diagnoses that are critical to ensuring that individuals with
disabilities receive appropriately tailored services. 20' Because the evidence
demonstrating that people with disabilities who have challenging
behaviors can be served better in the community than in institutional
placements, New York law, which provides that a defendant may be found
"mentally ill" only if commitment to a state psychiatric facility is
"essential" precludes such commitment. 2 6 The brief notes the variety of
services available to Mr. McCollum in the community through New
York's disability services agency, services that can be individually tailored
to his needs. 20 7 These include supports for housing, transportation, and
behavioral issues. 20 8 These services stand in contrast to his institutional
and is likely to
placement, which cannot be individually tailored
20 9
exacerbate his challenging behaviors and traumas.
The brief argues that the principle of community integration,
reflected in both state law and the ADA, requires the state to avoid
needless institutionalization of Mr. McCollum given that appropriate,
200.

Id. at 1,27.

201.

Id. at 1-2.

202.

Id. at 33, 35.

203.
Brief of Amici Curiae The Bazelon Center For Mental Health Law, The Autistic Self
Advocacy Network, The Arc of the United States, and The National Disability Rights Network in
Support of Defendant-Appellant Darius M.'s Motion for Leave to Appeal at 5, People v. McCollum,
No. 2018-14953 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018) [hereinafter BriefofAmici Curiae, People v. McCollum].
204.
Id. at 6-17.

205.

Id. at 6.

206.

N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 330.20(1)(d) (McKinney 2019); Brief of Amici Curiae, People v.

McCollum, supra note 203, at 6-7.
207.
208.
209.

Brief of Amici Curiae, People v. McCollum, supra note 203, at 9-11.
Id. at 11-12.
Id. at 12.
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community-based settings are available to him and are proven
conclusively to deliver better outcomes for people with disabilities while
also ensuring public safety.2" ° As the first reported case in New York to
find that a defendant diagnosed with autism is "mentally ill" or has a
"dangerous mental disorder" for the purpose of involuntary commitment
in a secure psychiatric facility, this case has significant implications for
individuals with autism or other developmental disabilities who may now
be at risk of involuntary, long-term placement in institutions that are
incapable of meeting their needs.2 ' As stated in the brief:
The trial court's decision flies in the face of the legal and medical
necessity to limit involuntary commitment to circumstances in which
it
is
"essential."
The
relevant
New
York
statute,
N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 330.20 ("CPL § 330.20"), includes this
explicit requirement-and a contrary approach would conflict with the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and Supreme Court
precedent. The principle of community integration-reflected in
CPL § 330.20 (as properly interpreted), and enshrined in the
Americans with Disabilities Act as recognized by the Supreme Court
in Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999)-requires public entities to
avoid needless institutionalization of individuals with disabilities who
can be served in community settings. Decades of research and
experience compel the conclusion that community-based services
deliver better outcomes for individuals who do not require
institutionalization, and better serve the purpose of CPL § 330.20 to
2 12
balance individual rights and public safety.
In 2019, the court
21 3
explanation.

denied Mr. McCollum's

appeal

without

III. APPLYING OLMSTEAD TO NON-THERAPEUTIC SETTINGS
There are a variety of considerations at play when determining how
Olmstead might be applied in the criminal justice context. The
"fundamental alteration" defense embedded in the ADA stands for the
proposition that the government does not have an unqualified obligation
to limit disability discrimination. The regulations for Title II of the ADA
state: "A public entity shall make reasonable modifications in policies,
practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid
discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the public entity can
demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally alter the
nature of the service, program, or activity."'2 14 This defense prevents
litigants from demanding that the State create entirely new services to meet
210.
211.
212.
213.
February
214.

Id. at 4-5.
Id. at 18-19.
Id. at 4-5.
Decision and Order on Motion, People v. McCollum, No. 2018-14953 (N.Y. App. Div.
1, 2019).
28 C.F.R. § 35.130(7)(i) (2019) (emphasis added).
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their needs215 (though more extensive relief has frequently been achieved
via consent decrees and settlement agreements).216 In Olmstead, the state
of Georgia resisted court intervention, among other reasons, on the
grounds that the plaintiffs demands would "fundamentally alter[]" the
State's activity, in that it was already using all available funds to provide
services to other persons with disabilities.21 7 In evaluating the State's
fundamental alteration defense, the Supreme Court held that the court
"must consider, in view of the resources available to the State, not only the
cost of providing community-based care to the litigants, but also the range
and the
of services the State provides others with mental disabilities,
21 8
equitably.,
services
those
out
mete
to
obligation
State's
There is no clear formula to determine whether a proposed
modification will constitute a fundamental alteration of a state or local
government's service system under the ADA. It is well-established,
though, that cost alone is not sufficient to mount this defense.2" 9 As the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has noted, if a state
could satisfy the fundamental alteration defense based on cost alone, such
20
an interpretation would "swallow the integration mandate whole."
Congress and the courts have recognized that compliance with Olmstead
and
may require "substantial short-term burdens, both financial
221 to achieve the goal of community integration. 222
administrative"
Another qualification to consider is that in defining a "qualified
individual with a disability," the Title II regulations state that the ADA
"does not require a public entity to permit an individual to participate in
or benefit from the services, programs, or activities of that public entity
when that individual poses a direct threat to the health or safety of
See, e.g., Lane v. Kitzhaber, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1208 (D. Or. 2012) (describing the
215.
"forbidden remedy" of "requiring defendants ... provide .... a certain standard of care or level of
benefits").
See, e.g., supra notes 80-84; Settlement Agreement, United States v. Georgia, No. 1:10216.
CV-249-CAP (N.D. Ga. October 19, 2010); Settlement Agreement, United States v. Delaware, No.
1:11-cv-40591 (D. Del. July 6, 2011); Settlement Agreement, United States v. Virginia, No.
3:12cvO59-JAG (E.D. Va. July 17, 2012); Settlement Agreement, United States v. New Hampshire,
No. 1:12-cv-00053 (D.N.H. Feb. 12, 2014).

217. Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 595 (1999).
Id. at 597.
218.
219. See, e.g., Steimel v. Wernert, 823 F.3d 902, 915 (7th Cir. 2016); Pashby v. Delia, 709 F.3d
307, 323 (4th Cir. 2013); Radaszewski ex reL. Radaszewski v. Maram, 383 F.3d 599, 614 (7th Cir.
2004) (finding that evidence that a modification would "substantially increase" a state's expenditures
cannot, alone, defeat an integration claim under Title II); Frederick L. v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 364
F.3d 487, 496 (3d Cir. 2004) ("[S]tates cannot sustain a fundamental-alteration defense based solely
upon the conclusory invocation of vaguely-defined fiscal constraints."); Townsend v. Quasim, 328
F.3d 511, 519-20 (9th Cir. 2003); Fisher v. Okla. Health Care Auth., No. 02CV-762P(C) (N.D. Okla.
Nov. 1, 2002), rev'd, 335 F.3d 1175, 1186 (10th Cir. 2003).
Pa. Prot. & Advocacy, Inc. v. Pa. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 402 F.3d 374, 381 (3d Cir. 2005).
220.
Fisher, 335F.3dat 1183 (quotingH.R. REP. NO. l01-485, pt. 3, at 50(1990),as reprinted
221.
in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445,473).

222.

For a more in-depth analysis of the fundamental alteration defense, see, e.g., Jennifer

Mathis, Where Are We Five Years After Olmstead?, 38 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. POVERTY L. & POL'Y
561, 561-62 (2005); Salzman, supra note 72, at 157 58.

DENVER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96:4

others." 223 A "direct threat" is defined as a "significant risk to the health
or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by a modification of policies,
practices, or procedures. 2 24 In determining whether an individual poses a
direct threat, the ADA requires that the public entity:
[M]ake an individualized assessment, based on reasonable judgment
that relies on current medical knowledge or on the best available
objective evidence, to ascertain: the nature, duration, and severity of
the risk; the probability that the potential injury will actually occur;
and whether reasonable modifications of policies, practices, or
procedures or the provision of auxiliary aids or services will mitigate
the risk.225
The Title II regulations further state that "[a] public entity may
impose legitimate safety requirements necessary for the safe operation of
its services, programs, or activities," but qualify this limitation by noting
that "the public entity must ensure that its safety requirements are based
on actual risks, not on mere speculation, stereotypes, or generalizations
about individuals with disabilities."2'26 While the concept of direct threat
was not raised in Olmstead, it is important to consider when applying the
integration mandate in the criminal justice context.
As the cases, briefs, and other authorities discussed in Part III of this
Article indicate, applying the principles of the Olmstead decision to at
least some aspects of the criminal justice system is fully consistent with
the analytical framework of that case. In the context of disrupting the
school-to-prison
pipeline,
programs,
incompetency
diversion
determinations, and post-incompetency commitments, advocates for
defendants with disabilities can point to the treatment purposes that
underlie these interventions and apply the tripartite test of Olmstead in a
straightforward manner: that placement in a community-based program is
required if the treating professionals recommend it, the person does not
oppose it, and placement would not constitute a fundamental alteration of
the governmental prograr. Judicial recognition of this analysis would
make an important contribution to reducing the incarceration and
institutional confinement of people with disabilities who become
inappropriately enmeshed in the criminal justice system.
But could Olmstead be extended even further to argue that, in certain
instances, individuals with mental disabilities who are serving penal
sentences must be placed in community-based programs in lieu of jails or
prisons? We have not found a case that has so held, but we can speculate,
at least tentatively, on how the analysis should proceed. As noted above,
223.
28 C.F.R. § 35.139(a) (2019).
224.
Id. § 35.104(4).
225.
Id. § 35.139(b).
226.
Id. § 35.130(h); see also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMMONLY ASKED QUESTIONS, supra
note 32; The Americans with Disabilities Act: Title II Technical Assistance Manual, ADA.Gov,
https://www.ada.gov/taman2.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2019).
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although some individuals with mental disabilities do commit crimes and
must be held accountable for them where appropriate, it is vital to consider
that the behavior leading to their involvement in the justice system is too
frequently a result of not receiving appropriate community-based services
that address disability-related needs. Further, incarceration often does
nothing to provide a habilitative or therapeutic environment to remedy the
underlying basis for problematic conduct due to a lack of understanding
and prejudice.

227

First, Title II of the ADA applies only to someone who is a "qualified
individual with a disability." 228 The statute defines such an individual as
one "who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or
practices ... meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of

services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public
entity. '229 A person with a disability, who is serving a criminal sentence,
might not be considered "qualified" for a community-based alternative if
there were legitimate penological justifications-such as deterrence or
retribution-to incarcerate the person. On the other hand, if a person
became eligible for work-release or other less restrictive programs, that
person could become a qualified individual who should then be eligible
for placement upon satisfaction of the Olmstead criteria. Where such
programs already exist, and are simply not being offered to individuals
with mental disabilities, it seems that it would be relatively easy to
overcome a fundamental alteration defense.
Second, if an individual with a disability who is convicted of a crime
were deemed too dangerous to serve in a community-based program, the
professionals making the determination in the first part of the tripartite
Olmstead test presumably would conclude it was not appropriate for the
person to enter a community-based program (at least while the person was
still considered dangerous). Even if a determination of an individual's
possible dangerousness were not part of the professional's assessment,
which seems unlikely, 230 a state agency could assert a direct threat defense
to challenge the proposed placement.
Thus, the very structure of Title II of the ADA and the Olmstead
integration mandate are flexible enough to be presumptively applied in the
criminal justice context.

227.
228.
229.
230.

See BERNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 9.
42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2018).
Id. § 12131(2).
For example, in the Seth case discussed above, all the professionals who assessed Markelle

Seth for a determination of whether community-based placement was appropriate for him considered
whether the proposed placement would protect the community as well as provide him with needed
services. Complaint, Seth v. District of Columbia, supra note 118, at 4, 17, 23.
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CONCLUSION

As Margo Schlanger has pointed out: "Opposition to mass
incarceration has entered the mainstream. But except in a few states, mass
decarceration has not, so far, followed., 23 As described above, advocates,
lawyers, and governmental officials have increasingly deployed the
Olmstead framework creatively in non-institutional civil contexts. Those
who are concerned about mass incarceration may also want to explore
using the integration mandate to make at least a dent in that phenomenon
as it affects the many people with disabilities who constitute a
disproportionate percentage of the jail and prison population in this
country.
In this Article, we have identified those cases (and their underlying
rationales) that have begun to use Olmstead in just this manner, whether
to divert people with disabilities from the criminal justice system entirely;
provide services to them in more integrated settings and expand the
community-based settings that are available; or recognize that people
evaluated for competency to stand trial or determined unrestorably
incompetent to stand trial must be housed in community-based,
therapeutic settings rather than segregated, punitive ones. While some of
the cases and amicus briefs discussed above have not yet been successful
in securing the requested relief, it is important to note that, where opinions
have been issued in these cases, they either ignored the Olmstead analysis
entirely or did not rule out the possibility that it could apply in the criminal
justice context under a different set of facts. Although all of the litigation
described in this Article is in its early stages, if pursued thoughtfully, using
the integration mandate in this context has the potential to begin to reverse
the disturbing trend of over-incarceration of people with disabilities and
permit a renewed focus on providing them with the humane, communitybased supports to which they are entitled.

231.

Schlanger, supra note 6, at 1-2.

